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Abstract- In this paper the philosophical concept of 
authenticity is used as a framing device for providing an 
interpretation of aspects of both ethical and practical action on 
the part of information systems (IS) professionals. It is argued 
that ethical codes and IS methods may be of limited value in IS 
work. Both ethical codes and IS methods are complicated by the 
need to adopt positions on, and give recommendations about, IS 
practice. One key problem here is that IS analysts and designers 
have to intervene in organisations (and thereby intervene in the 
lives of the members of those organisations). It is argued that an 
important issue for IS research is whether they to do so in (what 
will be characterised as) an authentic manner, or in sincere 
adherence with either a code of professional ethics or with a 
series of methodological precepts. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Participants in information systems development can 
expect to have their professional judgement tested in a 
variety of ways, many of which are catalogued in Codes of 
Practice issued, for example by the ACM and BCS. Such 
codes are concerned with guiding action and are normative in 
character, generally described by deontological or 
consequentialist theories of ethics. In strict deontological 
ethics certain standards of conduct should never be broken; 
in consequentialism the ethics of any action can be evaluated 
according to particular criteria, usually well-being, happiness 
or the greater general good. Ethical codes, however, are 
notoriously difficult to apply and enforce. Because such 
codes necessarily theorise ethical issues in gross and abstract 
terms, identifying and resolving ethical dilemmas is 
ultimately dependent on the probity of those involved. The 
type of professional know-how required for identifying 
problems and concerns not previously envisaged differs 
markedly from that required for the mastery of skills for the 
prosecution of pre-specified goals and objectives. Walsham 
identifies this with the idea of a virtuous practitioner [1]. 
Although it is common to treat ethics as a system of rules 
forbidding us to do things, the topic may be treated as the 
basis for thinking about how we are to live [2]. Because of 
the impossibility of pre-specifying ethical issues and relating 
them faithfully to actual contexts (for example, when is 
“whistle-blowing” justified?), the limitations of ethical codes 
may be succeeded by a concern for personal authenticity. 
Authenticity is usually defined as that which is achieved 
when people take hold of the direction of their own lives 
without the direction being determined for them by external 
factors [3]. The virtuous practitioner has responsibilities of 
interpretation and application, choices that may not be very 
comfortable, but which may be evaded by appealing to some 
external authority. Such elision of authenticity may be 
countered with appeals for reflective evaluation, but many 
accounts of the ‘reflective practitioner’ remain highly 
instrumental in their prime focus on mundane ‘knowing how’ 
or craft aspects of the profession.  
The philosophical concept of authenticity represents a 
focal point for this paper’s authors who are pursuing distinct 
– but related research themes: philosophical critique and 
clarification of IS, and dialogical aspects of IS. The concept 
of authenticity presented here is informed mainly from the 
work of Nietzsche and Bakhtin [4,5]. It is hoped that 
problematizing the issue of authentic intervention represents 
a contribution not just to current IS ethics debates, but also to 
contemporary concerns on the relationships between theory, 
practice and teaching, and the role and authority of 
methodologies.  
In this paper authenticity is used as a framing device for 
providing an interpretation of aspects of both ethical and 
practical action on the part of information systems 
professionals. One key problem here is that IS analysts and 
designers have to intervene in organisations (and thereby 
intervene in the lives of the members of those organisations). 
It is argued that an important issue for IS research is whether 
they do so in (what will be characterised as) an authentic 
manner, or in sincere adherence with either a code of 
professional ethics or with a series of methodological 
precepts. We shall begin by canvassing the idea of 
authenticity, before assessing methodological and theoretical 
precepts, as well as reflective practice. 
II. AUTHENTICITY 
Ironically, although many philosophers held that 
authenticity could provide a viable ethical norm, the idea 
exists in tension or even contradiction to the imposition of 
  
codes of practice, “The concept of authenticity is a protest 
against the blind, mechanical acceptance of an externally 
imposed code of values.” [6]. Because of the very nature of 
the concept, authenticity denies any rigid a priori essence and 
resists the compliance of given standards. Indeed, the key to 
authenticity is in the understanding that any such compliance 
would be to abandon one’s own responsibility for freely 
forming one’s selfhood and values. Authentic agents are 
obliged to create values and patterns of behaviour from their 
own mental resources; to invent their own way and pattern of 
life. Trilling takes authenticity to be an ontological claim 
about humanity; for a human being to be authentic means to 
be treated by others like a human being and not like a 
machine or a sub-human [7]. Importantly, it means to be 
attributed epistemic responsibility, and to be deprived of 
authenticity means not to be able to function as a human 
being with respect to things that matter. For example, if a 
culture values privacy or free expression, to be deprived of 
these things would mean living an inauthentic existence.  
Ontologically, authenticity expresses a complementary 
self/other relationship which presupposes recognition of the 
self by others and vice versa. The ethical consequence is that 
in order to acknowledge our own authenticity, then we must 
respect the uniqueness and authenticity of others, and 
therefore acknowledge that the self/other relationship will be 
one of difference; a relation which must be respected and 
sustained in ethical practice. The possibility of ethics 
therefore, also depends upon a community, the members of 
which are sufficiently authentic themselves to distinguish the 
authenticity of others. If an ethical norm is appropriate here it 
would be Kant’s aphorism that morality is primarily 
concerned with treating others as ends in themselves rather 
than as means to ends. 
Given that there is a lack of absolute guidance as to how 
one is to act in any given situation, the question of “what 
should one do...?” raises severe difficulties. Some sorts of 
authenticity questions may be familiar to the readers of this 
paper. The authors have experienced several authenticity 
problems; a few are given as example questions here: 
1. Should I use a methodology which has embedded values 
that I do not agree with? 
2. Should I use a methodology, which, in my judgement, is 
wholly inappropriate to the circumstances pertaining in the 
organisation? 
3. Should I attempt to improve organisational performance 
by introducing greater accountability in a low-wage 
organisation? 
These are difficult ethical questions, and whilst some of 
these may be covered by the codes of conduct and practice of 
professional IS bodies, others may not be [8]. Also, such 
decisions require degrees of interpretation, and therefore 
judgements about such matters are likely to vary from person 
to person. In any case, not all IS professionals are members 
of professional societies, and not all those members may be 
aware of the codes of conduct and practice, and no doubt 
some will choose to ignore such things. More importantly, 
adherence to any such code is unlikely to be practically 
enforceable; adherence will therefore have to be “granted” 
voluntarily by the IS professionals concerned: 
“In the scientific community the medical specialist has 
better defined ethical codes than most other groups... They 
are also enforced by powerful sanctions such as expulsion 
from the medical profession if serious infringements occur. 
Many other professionals, including the British Computer 
Society, have also drawn up ethical codes but these are often 
vague and difficult to apply and enforce... Ethical 
responsibilities will also vary both with the nature of work 
that is being carried out and the nature of the social 
environment where the work is conducted.” [9]. 
The concept of authenticity is often primarily connected to 
considerations put forward by Nietzsche (1844-1900): 
“There is a term Nietzsche himself rarely employs, but 
which is the most suitable label for a constant object of his 
philosophical concern - ‘authenticity’... Nietzsche’s question 
could now be posed as follows: ‘How to live authentically?’ 
... comfortable acceptance of inherited values, or comfortable 
evasions of questions of value, will both do the trick. But 
these are not authentic alternatives...” [10]. 
Nietzsche’s statements and concerns about such issues are 
a constant theme in his texts [11,12]. Cooper elaborates the 
concept of authenticity via some examples from teaching. He 
explicates the problems thus: 
“A familiar disturbance felt by the teacher arises when 
some of these [educational] policies, values, or whatever, are 
not ones to which he can subscribe... The disturbance 
produces a problem of authenticity, for unless the teacher 
resigns or is willing to invite considerable friction at work, he 
must simulate agreement to views that are not his. 
[Alternatively] ... The thought which may strike the teacher is 
not that he cannot subscribe to, or authoritatively transmit, 
various beliefs and values, but that he has slipped into, fallen 
into, unreflective acceptance of them. They have become part 
of the school’s furniture; they go with the job like the free 
stationery.” [13]. 
Such questions are intensely personal, and researching how 
IS professionals deal (or should deal) with such questions as 
arise in IS practice will be necessary if real progress is to be 
made towards the aim of improving IS practice, because 
slavish adherence to externally imposed codes of conduct is 
not necessarily a guarantor of ethically proper behaviour (it 
has been argued). 
III. AUTHENTICITY AND METHODOLOGICAL PRECEPTS 
An example of a tension between methodological 
adherence and authentic systems development practice can be 
found within the ubiquitous concept of the systems 
development life cycle. This was originally derived from an 
empirical study by Barry Boehm [14]. The consequent life 
cycle model has been absorbed into nearly every structured 
IS method propounded ever since; if it is criticised, it is 
  
criticised as being a prescription that does not “work” in 
practice (whatever the precise form of the criticism takes). 
The usual criticism runs along the lines that the longer one 
takes to “get the requirements right” the longer it takes to 
develop a system at all - and the greater the likelihood 
becomes that the requirements are “out of date”: 
“[T]he development life cycle concept relies heavily on the 
initial definition of the problem being complete and correct 
and that the users’ requirements will not change in the time 
taken to progress to final implementation. In the case of 
modern complex information-systems neither of these 
assumptions can safely be made ...” [15]. 
Nevertheless the widespread use of life cycle methods for 
IS developments continues relentlessly (although numerous 
alternative approaches are often propounded). A recent UK 
survey was conducted to investigate the use of systems 
development methods (amongst other things). This survey 
indicated, “Within systems development, 57% [of systems 
development staff] claim to be using a systems development 
methodology.” [16]. The effect of the widespread adoption of 
structured methods is to remove personal authenticity from 
the systems development personnel. Lewis argues: 
“The legacies of hard systems thinking, such as the idea of 
the development life cycle, have become so deeply ingrained 
in IS thinking that only rarely is note taken of the constraints 
that they impose upon the way we view the development of 
information-systems.” [17]. 
Now, as received wisdom becomes a guiding force for 
decision making, so the possibilities for making any genuine 
decisions tend to evaporate. As Golomb argues: 
“In the context of our everyday humdrum lives, it is hard 
to know what we genuinely feel and what we really are, since 
most of our acts are expressions and consequences of 
conditioning, imitation and convenient conformity.” [18]. 
Adherence to methodological prescriptions may provide 
systems development staff with a convenient set of reasons 
for not doing what they (truly) feel that they ought to do. The 
point to stress here is that these motivations (to do what one 
ought to do on authentic versus methodological grounds) are 
not identical – they are very different. Indeed, Wastell has 
pointed out the degree to which the adherence to 
methodological prescriptions has a value as a defence 
mechanism for systems development staff. Although the main 
focus of Wastell’s paper is to demonstrate how it comes 
about that methodology gets used as a social defence 
mechanism he also argues that what is actually needed in 
systems development situations is quite different: 
“[M]any analysts apparently developed a fetishistic 
dependence on methodology. They appeared to withdraw 
from the real job of analysis, of engaging with users in an 
open and frank debate about system requirements. Instead 
they withdrew into the womb of security provided by the 
method. They worried about details of notation, of whether 
the method was being correctly implemented and of the need 
to press on and fulfil deadlines rather than ensure that they 
had really understood what the users wanted.” [19].  
This can be interpreted as a failure of authenticity on the 
part of the systems development staff encountered by 
Wastell,1 and begs the question of the relation between 
methodology, theory and practice. That theories should guide 
practice in some way, and by implication, that theorists and 
policymakers should guide practitioners are deeply 
entrenched ideas, particularly - but not just - in IS. Projects in 
IS typically combine complex technical challenges, often 
poorly understood or ambiguous organisational practices 
with the need to efficiently co-ordinate the work of all who 
contribute to, or have vested interests in, the development. 
By providing a set of techniques to support analysis and 
design, and a model of project development which prescribes 
an explicit task structure, methodology may promise 
amelioration of these difficulties. Furthermore, 
methodologies may facilitate learning and co-operation in the 
provision of a common language and cognitive structure. 
However, as we have seen, the verity of methods lies in the 
transition from the normative realm of methodological theory 
to the messy world of practice. 
The IS profession is characterised by specialised technical 
training and circumscribed theorising [20]. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that most methodologies only treat technical 
and rational issues [21]. This perspective may be defined as 
‘technicism’, i.e. the presumption that good practice is 
equivalent to efficient performance which achieves ends that 
are theoretically prescribed for analysts [22]. Technicism 
holds that all practice is like production or service industry, 
that quality may be guaranteed through standardisation of the 
development process, and that ultimately professional 
practical judgements are suspect. This may delude 
practitioners into thinking that they are less free to act than 
they actually are, and ethical responsibility for an action may 
be evaded by appeal to a theoretical imperative (such as the 
laws of nature or the market).  
For technicists, general theories can be set out to guide 
particular practices, but the narrower technical education may 
be supplemented with sociology, psychology and 
organisational studies to produce students better equipped to 
evaluate ethical and moral issues. The sort of criticisms 
levelled at this academic model are that theoretical studies 
are insufficient to guarantee effective IS professional 
practice, or that their relevance to practice is not at all clear, 
or indeed, that theory construction has become a barrier to 
real world understanding [23]. Both theory-construction and 
the direct technical application of theories to practice can be 
challenged by directly applying to IS an argument made by 
Carr in teacher education [24]: 
1. The discovery of truths about the world or the 
construction of theoretical explanations are not the principal 
goals of IS enquiry, deliberation or endeavour. In this sense, 
                                                           
1 In the case study discussed herein, the method used was the UK’s 
SSADM. 
  
at least, IS theorising does not (paradoxically) appear to be 
primarily theoretical.  
2. The precise relationship of such undeniably theoretical 
forms of enquiry as psychology, sociology, cybernetics and 
so on to the processes of practical deliberation about 
organisations, the workplace and people is inferentially 
complex, value-laden, contingent, and by no means 
straightforwardly construable in terms of direct application. 
3. Although IS discourse is primarily practical and 
therefore concerned with the achievement of certain sorts of 
goods, it differs from technical deliberation in not being 
exclusively or even primarily concerned with questions of 
efficiency and effectiveness in the course of such pursuit. IS 
problems therefore cannot be solely construed in technical 
terms.  
4. Therefore IS discourse is evaluative or moral rather 
than solely theoretical or technical. Evaluative arguments, 
unlike theoretical arguments are defeasible, and, unlike 
technical inferences, means are invariably related to ends 
internally or constitutively rather than externally or causally 
(as theory demands).  
This is not to deny the importance of theoretical studies, 
truth, technique or efficiency, but merely to affirm where the 
logical centre of gravity about IS discourse and enquiry 
should be located. The information and evidence supplied by 
theoretical research may indeed be indispensable for 
deliberations about what is to be done in the interests of good 
practice; but - because there can be no direct ethical 
derivation of an ought from an is - such information cannot 
directly dictate the course of our practical decisions where 
these have a moral or evaluative focus and implications [25]. 
Carr further identifies this perspective on professional 
development and education with a Cartesian interpretation of 
rational conduct; i.e., as a behavioural event preceded by an 
episode of theorising. The error of this view has long been 
exposed, and many non-Cartesian studies of human conduct 
are available within the general IS corpus, 
e.g.[26,27,28,29,30]. The unreflective or blind application of 
theories or methodologies is incompatible with authentic 
existence, but some may find comfort where theoretical 
prescription appears to limit their freedom to choose and 
offers them a way of opting out of a moral requirement to 
think and justify in particular contexts. 
IV. AUTHENTIC INTERVENTION 
Many models of authenticity have been propounded, but in 
the remainder of this paper we will only consider those 
proposed firstly by Nietzsche, and secondly by Bakhtin 
[31,32].  
Structured / life cycle methodological precepts make little 
allowance for the influence of choice on the part of the IS 
professionals - who will be (methodologically) guided to 
investigate practically everything relevant in a particular 
study. Of course, such detailed and thorough investigations 
are not only difficult to achieve practically, but run counter to 
the actual social-psychological conditions in which analysts 
operate. Firstly, on organisational (social) grounds: 
“The modern organisational environment is a far cry from 
the well-ordered world of the classical bureaucracy, with its 
elaborate hierarchical division of labour and highly 
routinized procedures. The modern organisation, in contrast, 
is characterised by constant innovation, by flux and fluidity 
[which] presents a potent challenge  to the social defences 
that characterise the traditional organisation, such as the 
bureaucratic ritual, which contain anxiety by narrowing 
attention and by defining rigid roles. The new demands 
require a broadening of rules, wider boundaries, increased 
integration and interdependence.” [33]. 
Secondly, can the concept of Nietzschean authenticity help 
us to understand the psychological demands placed on 
contemporary IS professionals? Nietzsche’s arguments on 
such issues can be found in Book Five of The Gay Science 
[34]. However, his style of writing makes no concession to 
the reader and does not lend itself easily to the discourse of 
IS development! Golomb makes the following points – 
concerning how Nietzsche conceptualised the relationship 
between authenticity and epistemology - in a contemporary 
manner:  
“An individual’s life comprises a boundless number of 
experiences and notions, including a tremendous amount of 
superfluous information. Through awareness of one’s 
authentic needs one may organise and refine this chaos into a 
harmonious sublimated whole. Initially the self is a bundle of 
conflicting desires and an array of contradictory possibilities. 
The self’s unity is a function of its own decisions and 
creations. The search for authenticity is seen as the wish to 
reflect one’s own indeterminacy by spontaneous choice of 
one of the many possible ways of life. The individual is a 
kind of artist who freely shapes his self as a work of art.” 
[35]. 
Prima facie, a great deal of systems development work in a 
turbulent organisational environment can – indeed must – 
depend on the authenticity of the development staff if good 
systems are to be developed. Slavish adherence to 
methodological prescriptions can only serve to deny the 
insights and wisdom attained by systems development staff 
(about the actual needs of the organisation) over many years 
of experience. Moreover, it can be conjectured that the 
widespread use of contract IS/IT staff – often with disastrous 
consequences – may be indicative that insufficient attention 
has been paid, by IS managers, to the role that authenticity 
plays in good systems development [36]. 
V. AUTHENTICITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
A basic difference between technical and moral reasoning 
is captured by repeating Kant’s aphorism that morality is 
primarily concerned with treating others as ends in 
themselves rather than as means to ends. Schon associates the 
former with an epistemology of practice derived from 
positivist philosophy, which he terms technical rationality. 
  
This demands practitioners be instrumental problem solvers 
who select technical means best suited to reaching 
appropriate decisions. Rigorous professionals solve well-
formed instrumental problems by applying theory and 
technique derived from systematic, preferably scientific 
knowledge. He maintains that real world problems do not 
present themselves to practitioners as well-formed structures, 
indeed, they rarely present themselves as problems at all, but 
as messy, indeterminate situations [37]. 
The contrast to technical rationality appears in the idea of 
reflective practice where ends and means are continually 
reformulated by practitioners, and professionals’ own 
authentic insights are preserved. Theory and practice are 
constantly reinterpreted within particular contexts that can be 
described in both moral and technical ways, and more elusive 
agendas such as emancipation and democracy may be 
considered. However, Monach et al. found that although 
design engineers may produce extensive socio-technical 
analyses, they were not usually detached from practice or 
ever returned to and reflected upon post hoc [38]. But more 
importantly, ethical issues or issues of authenticity that 
escape reflective practice entirely are again likely to occur in 
situations where one is confronted with the ethical question 
of “what should one do...?”, because as Nietzsche astutely 
observed, life is lived forwards, but understood backwards. 
In other words, the person is participating in an event, and 
with others is already the architect of its meaning, before the 
‘reflective practice’ of contemplating the significance of that 
event.  
As IS professionals often acquire a fairly detailed 
knowledge of organisational and working practices the 
predicament of “what should one do?” may not be unusual. 
Examples from the authors’ experience include process 
controllers who release dangerous toxins to the environment 
at times when they could not be detected, and insurance 
actuaries who actively discriminate against certain categories 
of people. Neither of these practices would be publicly 
defendable but were deemed economically essential (and 
therefore practices technology should not disrupt). The 
practitioners’ immediate response to these dilemmas may 
serve to either legitimate or condemn such practices, but in 
all cases will contribute to the valorisation of these acts as 
‘normal’, ‘necessary’, ‘clandestine’, ‘improper’ and so on. 
The sociological concept “articulation work” is at issue 
here [39]. Articulation work refers to the continuous efforts 
required of people to assemble discontinuous elements into 
working configurations appropriate for the activities at hand. 
This intellectual, moral, social and tactile ‘spadework’ is 
necessary to craft the ambiguity and openness of such things 
as organisations, professional practices, materials and 
technologies into integrated working systems, and repairing 
these systems when they are seen to breakdown. Accordingly, 
the ethical and moral dimensions of the situations described, 
or what ‘ought’ to happen or ‘ought’ to be the case, are 
articulated by participants in situ. Practitioners will be 
‘thrown’2 into ethically ambiguous or dilemmatic situations 
by and with participants on the spot. It is possible to reflect 
on these situations at will, but the ethical moment, as it were, 
is at the point of the articulation of the meaning and 
significance of those events and actions, where the rights and 
wrongs (the ‘oughts’) are resolved, or not. One fundamental 
error or vulnerability of reflective practice then, as 
Nietzsche’s dictum suggests, and the earlier classroom 
example endorses, is that it is simply wrong placed.  
Nietzsche’s observation of life being lived forwards has 
been explored as the ‘world-as-event’ by Bakhtin, who 
maintains that there is a disjunction or gap between 
immediate experience and symbolic representations of this 
experience [40]. Bakhtin’s version of authenticity is 
associated with his attempt to reconcile prosaic life (bound to 
our physical bodies) and cognitive or theoretical thinking 
(free to move as it pleases) in a concept of the answerable 
act, where ethical responsibility arises out of the actualisation 
of both the repeated and the unique in specific social events. 
Bakhtin finds both aesthetic and theoretical thinking 
problematic precisely because they abstract what they 
imagine to be ‘important’ from actual events located within 
real time and space, and gain life of their own within this 
abstract realm of thinking. In doing so they deny a dialogical 
(answerable) relationship with the concrete other who is 
displaced by an abstract category within a monologic 
theoretical framework. In contrast, properly formed dialogic 
contexts will exhibit a ‘surplus of vision’ between users and 
designers that facilitates the effective learning processes upon 
which systems development depends. 
Retrospective mediation, such as reflective practice, 
employing aesthetic intuition or theoretical thinking divide 
the content of an act (its product) from the act itself (or its 
actual historical performance); the plurality of life as event is 
removed from its dialogic context and the subjective or 
theoretical singular moral consciousness is imposed in favour 
of the differentiated consciousness of otherness. Indeed, from 
this perspective, reflective practice entrenches technicism’s 
Cartesian egological reason by denying the significance of 
the other in the construction of ethical judgements. This 
fragments responsibility, and further violates Kant’s axiom 
by encouraging a purely cognitive relation to the other. 
Accordingly, the other is related to not as another subject but 
as an object. Zuboff has identified exactly the same 
egological imperative in the way that technology transforms 
the management function from acting with people to acting 
on them [41]. Not surprisingly, in some cases reflective 
practice may function as if it were just another technique for 
the improvement and assessment of IS, rather than for ethical 
or moral evaluation. 
                                                           
2 This term is derived from Heidegger who held that a human being is 
‘thrown’ into an already existing world and thereafter has to be 
responsible for itself and involve itself in a concerned or caring way in 
the world it finds.  
  
Bakhtin makes a special effort to reunite the aesthetic (the 
shaping of meaning in action) and the ethical (a cognitive 
element of the act itself) into one unified event, and suspects 
Kantian transcendental a prioris such as deontological and 
consequentialist ethics cannot address actual ethical problems 
and dilemmas as they emerge within the everyday lifeworld: 
 “‘Man-in-general’ does not exist; I exist and a particular 
concrete other exists. If I remain in communion with 
immediate experience and the concrete other, then I can 
maintain a relation of answerability to other selves and the 
world at large, and can accept full responsibility for my 
actions and words. Because my participation in the world is 
unique and non-recurrent, shared by no other person, no one 
else can accept responsibility on my behalf.” [42]. 
This explains Bakhtin’s forthright defence of personal 
authenticity: there is no ‘alibi’ in Being. In justifying our 
deeds by recourse to an abstract ideology or a sociopolitical 
imperative, we are provided with just such an alibi for 
evading our responsibility, in which case ‘what we have is 
not an answerable deed but a technical or instrumental 
action’. If we act purely out of obligation to such abstractions 
or rationalised expediencies, then we ‘turn into impostors or 
pretenders’, and abrogate the onus of answerability [43]. 
Authenticity is a predicate of acts rather than character or 
self, but refers to the integrity an innermost self, free of 
dogmatic beliefs, and the external manifestations of the self 
[44]. Bakhtin’s ethical norms (the norms of answerability) are 
articulated from inside the act, as the answerable act, not 
from an external belief system or discipline that places it into 
context. However, when subjected to the instrumental 
rationality and the bureaucratic structures that characterise 
many IS developments and applications, the viability of this 
sphere of sociality is seriously threatened, and with it the 
continuity of human responsibility and ethicality itself . 
Ironically, for technicism and reflective practice, as in 
most analyses, no particular individual ever has to exist, any 
abstract person will do. Yet the authenticity of the ‘moral 
agent’ has to be underwritten in the concrete ethical act, or 
the person need feel no responsibility for their own lives or 
acts Privileging the abstract and theoretical essentially leads 
away from responsibility and ethical action, instead of 
towards it. Theoretical thinking limits the degree to which 
individuals act responsibly because it locates the most 
important aspects of an act outside the responsible self 
participating in the event itself. This may be a grave failing, 
for it allows individuals to displace their unique 
responsibilities through appealing to a categorical ‘good’ 
posited by theoretical thinking.  
‘Located accountability’ may make professionals 
answerable for their actions, but the ethics of answerability 
remains provocative for IS because of an acquired mandate 
to contain the world within immutable, unified systems of 
concepts and categories [45]. The normalising of events, the 
displacement of acts from actions, and the inevitable 
separation of the prosaic and aesthetic involved in work 
textualization, conspire against Bakhtin’s ethical, authentic 
self maintaining a relation of answerability with a non-
abstract other.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has reported work on the philosophical concept 
of authenticity as providing both a better way of 
understanding the role played by ethical codes and IS 
methods, and as way of characterising actual IS practice, in 
modern organisations. Clearly work needs to be done in 
organisations to investigate how authenticity is actually 
mobilised (or not as the case may be) in organisations. 
Furthermore, the beneficial and/or detrimental affects that 
authentic activities have on the systems development process 
should also be investigated. 
Although the two versions of authenticity have been 
characterised (very basically, given space constraints), other 
philosophers and authors of literature have made important 
contributions to the debate – including Heidegger. Further 
research would need to investigate these views also. Finally, 
it should be noted that Adorno provides a powerful critique 
of the whole notion of authenticity [46]. This critique is 
mainly directed against the Heidegerrian version of 
authenticity. Suffice it to say here that such a critique needs 
to be taken seriously and warrants further research. 
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